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1. Introduction  
The European Union’s policies towards public services continue to be based around the drive to expand the 
internal market. One aspect of this is the set of Directives which require member states to liberalise the 
structure of the ‘network’ public services – electricity, gas, post, telecoms, rail, air, and urban transport. 
These sectors are of great economic and social importance, accounting for 7.5% of the whole output of the 
EU, employing 10.5 million people - over 5% of the EU workforce, and providing vital services for the 
entire population. 
 
The European Commission (EC) maintains that liberalisation in these sectors brings consumer choice and 
competition, and as a result lower prices and improvements in efficiency, which benefit both industry and  
consumers.  It produces its own annual report evaluating these policies, and is satisfied that these reports 
justify the continuation of existing policies and indeed further extension of liberalisation.  
 
This paper discusses three main issues: 
 
- the lack of public debate in Europe, compared with vigorous debate and policy revision in the USA 
- comparative evidence from the USA on the effects of liberalisation on prices 
- the uncertain economic effects of liberalisation compared with the benefits of public investment 
through the cohesion funds 
 
Finally, it discusses the criteria that could be used in reviewing and revising European public policies in 
these services. 
2. The missing public debates in Europe 
Liberalisation of the electricity, gas, telecoms, post, rail, air and urban transport services is required by 
legislation at EU level.  One consequence is that, for the first time in history, there are no differences 
between the systems of provision of electricity and gas services in countries of the European Union.  
 
In the former communist countries of eastern Europe, a single system of central state ownership and 
operation was centrally imposed until the ending of the communist regimes around 1990. The Nordic 
countries created a single electricity market in the early 1990s, under a mixture of state, municipal and 
private ownership. Up to 1998, other EU countries used various mixtures of state, municipal and private 
ownership, mainly but not exclusively with vertical integrated companies, developing trade in electricity on 
an adhoc basis, e.g. creating and using the UK-France interconnector.  
 
This diversity ended in 1998, when the first electricity and gas directives imposed a single standard form of 
sectoral organisation on all member states. This uniform, EU-wide legislation prohibits the use of vertically 
integrated monopolies, whether publicly owned or regulated, and requires all EU member states to operate a 
wholesale and retail market in electricity. The former public policy debates on the merits of different systems 
can no longer be held at national level, because a change of policy in any of the 27 member states would 
require a decision at EU level.  
 
There is an annual evaluation of these sectors, conducted by the European Commission, which should at 
least provide an opportunity for a public policy debate.
1
 The European Parliament in October 2001 specified 
that public debate should form part of the process, requested greater public participation and proposed to 
“organise the debate within the various existing forums (Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the 
Regions, consultative bodies, associations involved in services of general interest initiatives and consumer 
associations)”. In 2002 the Commission promised that the evaluations would include “a permanent 
mechanism for the monitoring of citizens’ opinion and their evolution” , the consultation of stakeholders, 
including the social partners, and a great expansion of public participation 
2
.  
 
But the EC has never conducted these evaluations through a public and democratic framework, and has 
simply published an annual evaluation as a technical report - the document is not addressed to any of the 
EU’s democratic institutions, but simply designated as a ‘Commission Staff working document’. No actors 
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outside the Commission are involved in the production of the reports; no process is created for assessment of 
the issues through the democratic institutions of the EU and its member states; and the reports are published 
only in English, indicating that widespread debate was neither expected nor desired. The only element of 
public discussion has been two meetings with the European Economic and Social Committee, which took 
place after the evaluations of 2005 and 2006 were published.   
 
Nor do these papers acknowledge the possibility of policies being reviewed in the light of evidence. The 
reports set out the set of beliefs behind liberalisation, including the expectation that competition will allow 
consumer choices and that this will drive down prices and increase efficiency. But none of the reports have 
ever indicated that liberalisation policies might be changed if the evidence showed this was not happening. 
 
In Europe, the control of policy by the EC, and the absence of public debate at national level, has been 
crucial in keeping the EU moving in the opposite direction to the global trend, according to Jamash and 
Pollitt, writing about the electricity sector 
3
: 
 
“Against this background of a world-wide slow-down in the pace of electricity reform, the centrally 
driven effort by the European Commission has been the main force that keeping the program on 
course. ….. Given the strategic position of the electricity industry in national politics, in the absence 
of policy at the level of the European Union (EU), the pace of reform in many member states would 
have been considerably slower.” 
 
By contrast, in countries outside the EU, there are vigorous public debates on these issues, and an active 
process of policy decisions to change liberalisation or regulation.  The actual experiences with liberalisation 
in the electricity sector, in particular, have led to vigorous public debates and policy changes.  The next 
section examines this process in the USA where the emerging trend is to reverse, halt, or slow down the 
process of liberalisation – in sharp contrast to the European Commission’s insistence that the solution to any 
problem must involve an acceleration of market opening. 
3. Decisions and debates on electricity liberalisation in the USA 
Although the USA is a single country, unlike the EU which is a federation of independent countries, the 
individual states of the USA have greater freedom to decide how to organise their electricity services than 
the member states of the EU.  
 
In the 1990s the USA federal government legislated to give independent generating companies access to 
transmission grids, without being subject to regulation by the states. The states however remained free to 
decide whether to unbundle public utilities, fully liberalise wholesale markets and introduce retail 
competition. These liberalisation policies are known in the USA as ‘deregulation’, because they involve 
ending the previous system of regulated monopoly utilities. At the end of 1990s, about half of the states had 
planned to introduced retail competition, but the California crisis of 2000, when blackouts and huge price 
rises resulted from the introduction of a wholesale electricity market,  halted this trend, and a number of 
states reversed their previous policy of moving towards de-regulation. Half of all the states in the USA have 
never considered introducing retail competition – a policy which is compulsory for member states in the EU. 
Table 1.  USA: States decisions on retail competition in electricity  
Full retail competition 17 Connecticut, D.C., Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia 
16 
Retail competition for large 
consumers only 
2 Nevada, Oregon 2 
Restructuring legislation 
delayed or repealed 
6 Arizona, Arkansas, California, New Mexico, Oklahoma, West Virginia 6 
Not considering 
deregulation 
26 Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa,Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming 
26 
APPA: Power Supply Procurement in Retail Choice States June 2007 
4
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Chart A. Variation in state policies on retail competition 
 
 
Source:  Rose, Kenneth and Karl Meeusen, 2006 Performance Review of Electric Power Markets: Review 
Conducted for the Virginia State Corporation Commission, August 27, 2006 
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/caseinfo/reports/2006_rose_1.pdf;   
 
Most significantly, the actual experience with deregulation has been so bad that those states which 
deregulated are now seeking ways to reverse their decision. The New York Times summarised the trend in 
September 2007 : 
   
“More than a decade after the drive began to convert electricity from a regulated industry into a 
competitive one, many states are rolling back their initiatives. …. The main reason behind the effort 
to return to a more regulated market is price. Recent Energy Department data shows that the cost of 
power in states that embraced competition has risen faster than in states that had retained traditional 
rate regulation.” 5 
 
The pattern of developments in the state of Delaware is typical. Retail competition and vertical unbundling 
were introduced in 1999, with a transitional arrangement for the state utility to continue providing a service 
of last resort while consumers transferred to competing suppliers offering lower prices. By 2006, no 
competitive market had emerged, and the vast majority of customers remained with the utility, which was 
now forced to raise prices to cover the cost of power purchased from the companies owning the generators. 
New legislation was passed to protect the consumer and re-assert that  “the generation, supply and sale of 
electricity…. shall be treated as a public utility service or function”.  The state of Delaware then hired an 
independent consultant to study the implications of re-regulation. The report, in May 2007, argued that there 
were no longer simple obvious technically best solutions, but a need for new democratic institutional 
mechanisms:  
“It is no longer clear who is responsible for anticipating the need for electricity and taking the steps 
needed to meet that need. It is not obvious what to do, and it is not clear who should do it….. No 
longer can utility management be expected to choose between alternatives without direction from the 
public… In the end, the public itself must choose between the uncertain options facing the electricity 
industry. It must express its preference for this risk over that risk, this possibility over that 
possibility. These preferences must guide investment and operational choices… new institutions are 
needed to identify the public’s “risk preferences” and to implement them, consistent with the 
public’s determinations.” 6 
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The democratic process has been central to the policy reviews. Special processes have been introduced to 
facilitate public debate in a number of states. In Maryland in July 2007, the governor convened an energy 
summit and the Maryland Public Service Commission held two days of conferences on the future of the 
state's energy policy.
7
 In Connecticut: “the Department of Public Utility Control (DPUC) opened a 
proceeding on whether the state should continue to rely on the market to set rates and to develop new 
generation, or whether some type of non-market-based solution should be considered.” 8 In New Jersey, the 
Governor has established a multi-agency, multi-stakeholder process led by the Governor and an agency 
designated by him, to review the policy.
 9
  
 
The debates in these states concern a number of options, none of which would be allowed under EU 
legislation, including whether long-term contracts should be encouraged; whether to allow vertical 
integration by distribution utilities owning generators, and whether to end retail competition. The state of 
Virginia decided to abandon retail choice for most customers and instead encourage utilities to build power 
plants, secure in the knowledge that they will have a sufficient customer base to finance the generators. 
10
 
Connecticut and Montana also decided to let utilities build their own power plants, to temper price increases 
in the wholesale market, and Ohio and Michigan are considering similar proposals.
 11 
The views taken by different actors in this debate has been influenced by the real experience with 
deregulation, not simply fixed by their original preference.  According to the new York Times, “Big 
industrial and commercial customers, the very forces that agitated for competition originally, are leading the 
return to traditional regulation. Then, and now, these big customers say they are being charged too much.” 12  
A leading right-wing think-tank, the Cato Institute, originally a strong advocate of liberalisation, has 
acknowledged the failure of the restructuring, and agrees that a return to regulation is the best available 
alternative: 
 
“Unfortunately, high-cost states have seen little price relief, and competition has had a negligible 
impact on prices. …Most arresting, however, is the fact that restructuring contributed to the severity 
of the 2000/2001 California electricity crisis and (some scholars also argue) the August 2003 
blackout in the Northeast, without delivering many efficiency gains. The poor track record of 
restructuring stems from systemic problems inherent in the reforms themselves. We recommend total 
abandonment of restructuring and a more thoroughgoing embrace of markets than contemplated in 
current restructuring initiatives. But we recognize that such reforms are politically difficult to 
achieve. A second-best alternative would be for those states that have already embraced restructuring 
to return to an updated version of the old, vertically integrated, regulated status quo.” 13 
 
In other countries there is evidence of similar political debates about the merits of liberalisation, resulting in 
decisions to defer or reverse liberalisation plans.  In 2005 Jamash and Pollitt referred to a ‘a world-wide 
slow-down in the pace of electricity reform’ 14, and this tendency has strengthened since then. Both Japan 
and South Korea, for example, have decided against introducing retail markets, retained vertically integrated 
utilities, and operate only limited forms of wholsesale competition. 
15
  
4. The impact on prices: evidence from the USA 
The impact of liberalisation on prices and consumers in the EU remains unclear. In theory the effect of 
competition is expected to drive down prices, in practice prices in network industries show no consistent 
pattern relative to the general movement in prices over the last 10 years.  One econometric study 
commissioned by the EU suggests that the contribution of  liberalisation has been to reduce prices in most 
sectors  below what they would otherwise have been, but has increased prices in two sectors 
16
; others 
suggest that the effect is neutral or negative, and that consumer experiences have worsened.
17
 
 
The EC remains committed to the theory that liberalisation and competition will enable consumers to choose 
better value suppliers, but the logic of this is undermined by the evidence in the EC’s own report that 
consumers are confused, reluctant to switch and unable to choose the right deal: in Portugal “90% of 
consumers made the ‘wrong’ tariff choice”, companies deliberately exploit this confusion to avoid 
competition, and many consumers avoiding switching suppliers altogether.
18
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Chart B. Price movements in liberalised sectors and overall in EU, 1996-2006 
 
Source: EC Evaluation of Performance of Network Industries 2006 
19
 
 
One problem with studying prices in the EU is that the policies are uniform across Europe, and it is not 
possible to compare liberalised countries with non-liberalised countries. Again, the USA provides valuable 
evidence in relation to the electricity sector, because states have been able to follow different policies in the 
USA, and so it is possible to compare price rises with and without liberalisation.  
 
Prices have risen faster in deregulated states: the average retail price of electricity in deregulated states grew 
half as fast again between 2002 and 2006 as the prices in rate-regulated states. Deregulated states had higher 
prices before deregulation, but the difference has grown since deregulation was introduced in the late 1990s.  
Chart C. Electricity price levels in regulated and deregulated states of USA 1996-2006 (Oct)  
 
Source: Marilyn Showalter: Mapping Electricity Policy. 2007 
20
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Some deregulated states have introduced price caps in order to curb the effects of price rises. The price rises  
in deregulated states which are not protected by price caps show an even sharper contrast with those in states 
which retain a regulated structure.     
Table 2.  Retail Price of Electricity in Rate-Regulated States and Deregulated States without 
Rate Caps in 2006 (cents /kWh) 
All Customers 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Jan-
Oct. 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
2002-06 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
2005-06 
Rate-regulated states 6.37 6.53 6.70 7.07 7.60 4.5% 7.6% 
Deregulated states without rate 
caps in 2006 
9.01 9.39 9.61 10.50 11.79 7.0% 12.3% 
Difference between rate-
regulated and deregulated states 
41% 44% 43% 48% 55%   
Source: Rosen et al 2007.
21
 
 
The annual survey by NUS Consulting Group of electric rates paid by large customers served by major 
utilities also shows that in 2007, the highest rates are in states which have deregulated. NUS commented that 
“Considered in the past by many as a means of lowering electricity prices, the central promise of 
deregulation has yet to be fulfilled for many consumers……Retail deregulation is currently either stalled or 
ineffective in much of the country."
 22
 A review by academics prepared for Virginia state in 2006 offers a 
general summary: 
“The evidence suggests that, at least so far, no discernible benefit can be seen for customers in 
restructured states once the rate caps have expired. Increasingly the evidence is beginning to now suggest 
that prices for customers in restructured states may actually be increasing faster than for customers in 
states that did not restructure.” 23 
 
Supporters of deregulation no longer claim that deregulation has reduced prices, only that it has not caused 
prices to increase. An analysis in June 2007 by the Brattle Group (which treats a larger set of states as 
‘deregulated’) estimated that average electricity rates have increased 31% in both restructured and non-
restructured states over the last decade and concluded that “Assuming costs increased similarly, it would 
appear restructuring did about as well as traditional regulation.” 24 25  
Explanations for the effect of deregulation include the fact that neither consumers nor companies behave 
according to the assumptions of market supporters. Consumers in general have been reluctant to change 
suppliers, preferring the stability of regulated or integrated public systems, as opposed to the volatility of a 
market which may or may not yield efficiency and price gains. These preferences undermine the rationale for 
retail competition, as pointed out by an analysis of the California experience: “If consumers wish to be 
shielded from such volatility and wish to remain passive consumers of energy, the benefits of a competitive 
regime are reduced.” 26   
Another consequence is that the old utilities retain nearly all the household customers, but no longer own 
their own power plants to supply them –and are thus vulnerable to the prices charged by the generating 
companies. And, as shown in California, the generating companies are able to exploit wholesale electricity 
markets, legally or illegally, rather than competing according to the expectations of market supporters: 
“During periods of peak demand the generation companies can charge prices far above the cost of 
production, in some cases 30 times the highest cost of production.  The effect, experiments at Carnegie 
Mellon and George Mason Universities have shown, is to allow near monopoly prices even when there are 
competing electric-generating companies.” 27 
 
One review of the US experience concludes that policy-makers should recognise the reality of this behaviour 
rather than making theoretical assumptions: 
“Coordinated interaction and tacit collusion … are the results of structural characteristics and are an 
intrinsic part of the electricity supply industry…Appropriate public policy has to be shaped to fit 
these structural characteristics, and not be based on what works in other industries or on notions of 
what should work in theory.”  28 
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Evidence from elsewhere also confirms the USA experience with the impact of liberalisation. A recent study 
of power reforms in former communist countries and in Latin America concludes that:  “The research 
findings suggest that neither unbundling nor introduction of a wholesale pool market on their own 
necessarily reduces the electric power price. In fact, contrary to expectations, there was a tendency for the 
price to rise.” 29 
5. Economic impact: productivity, employment, growth and cohesion 
There is still no clear evidence that liberalisation generates the efficiency gains or economic growth expected 
by its supporters. There may be an initial reduction in jobs leading to a one-off productivity gain, but with no 
evidence of any continuing or dynamic gains.  (For a more detailed discussion of the evidence, see earlier 
critiques of EC evaluation reports 
30
).  Such one-off gains, with no continuing improvements, may represent 
only a boost to profits at the expense of employees, similar in nature to the impact of private equity buyouts, 
where a change of ownership leads to “management breaking implicit agreements and transferring wealth 
from employees to new owners”. 31   
 
If there were major efficiency gains from liberalisation of these sectors, the benefits should be visible in 
overall European trends. But since the liberalisation directives started to be introduced in the late 1990s, the 
gap in productivity between the EU and the USA and Japan has widened (see chart).   
 
 The EC believes that the growth of the mobile telecom sector, in particular, can be attributed to 
liberalisation. But there is no basis for this assumption. Research on the development of mobile telecoms in 
the 1990s concluded that the development of digital technology and the licensing decisions of individual 
countries were the most important factors; that the introduction of competition had relatively little impact; 
and that incumbent telephone companies were not obstacles to development: “the effect from technological 
innovations has been much stronger than the effect of increasing the number of firms…No evidence of 
preemptive behaviour by incumbents could be found”. 32  The EC also naively suggests that technological 
advances lead to greater competition: “ Competition also arises through innovation, such as internet 
telephony (Voice over Internet Protocol)” 33, whereas in practice the mobile telecom oligopolies have erected 
significant barriers to the use of this technology, which threatens their own revenues. 
Chart D. Productivity growth in the US, EU-15 and Japan, 1995-2005 
 
Source: EC: Fourth Report On Economic And Social Cohesion  May 2007 
34
 
 
The evidence also suggests that the change in employment in the liberalised sectors is negative overall, with 
particularly large job losses in the energy sectors, only partly offset by employment growth in telecoms. In 
new member states, the employment trend is negative even in telecoms. The EC argues that jobs are created 
elsewhere in the economy, but this argument depends entirely on the impact of reducing prices for industry 
as a whole, and, as noted above, there is no clear evidence of this effect on prices.  (For a more detailed 
discussion of the evidence, see earlier critiques of EC evaluation reports 
35
).  
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Chart E. Employment trends in electricity, gas and water in EU 1996-2003 
 
Source: EC Evaluation report 2006, calculated from Groningen Database. 
 
One way of evaluating the impact of liberalisation is to compare it with the impact of another form of state 
intervention in industry, namely public investment. This is not only done by nation states: the EU itself also 
actively intervenes through the medium of public investment, through the structural and cohesion funds. 
While the contribution of liberalisation to growth, efficiency and economic cohesion remains uncertain, the 
contribution of public investment in infrastructure to economic development, growth and efficiency is well-
established. 
36
  
 
There is also evidence that it stimulates further gains through competition between sectors. The growth of 
total factor productivity in the USA from the 1920s to the 1970s was derived principally from public 
investment in electricity and roads networks, but the investment in road systems was also associated with a 
significant increase in productivity of the railway systems, because of competition between the different 
modes of transport.
 37
  This role of competition in multiplying efficiency gains in one sector may have more 
impact than the attempt by the EU liberalisation directives to force competition within each sector. 
Productivity gains arising from public investment or technology in one sector may be generalised through 
competition between different modes e.g. between road and rail; post, fixed and mobile telecom and internet; 
and electricity and gas (and district heating).  
 
Public investment in infrastructure has an especially positive impact on growth in less developed regions and 
countries. For example, public capital investment has had a demonstrably positive impact on industrial 
productivity in Italian regions, especially in the south, 
38
 and on the productivity of the manufacturing sector 
in Greece.
39
  
This positive developmental gain is clear in the impact of EU cohesion funds on growth, employment and 
productivity. These funds produce substantial positive gains in terms of economic growth and employment in 
the new member states.  This is not just the result of increased demand arising from the spending: about half 
of the benefits in terms of GDP and employment are the result of supply-side effects through improved 
productivity in the economy as a whole: “Supply side improvements account for around half of the gain.” 40 
These gains for new member states are almost neutral NMS at little short-term cost to the member states 
which contribute to the financing of these funds:  “For the EU-27, the overall effects are … predicted to be 
small and negative over most of the programming period, but positive in later years, indicating that cohesion 
policy adds to the growth of the EU as a whole in the long term, as well as assisting convergence.”  
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Chart F. Effect of cohesion policy spending 2007-2015 on GDP 
 
Source: EC: Fourth Report On Economic And Social Cohesion  2007 p. 97  Chart 2.2 
41
 
By contrast, the cohesion effects of the liberalisation directives appear to be regressive in terms of efficiency 
and employment. Productivity trends in energy have been rising in EU15, but level in NMS (in other sectors 
trends are similar in both sets of states - upwards in communications, level in inland transport).  Employment 
in communications and inland transport grew in the EU15 between 1996 and 2003, but fell in NMS: in 
electricity and gas employment fell in both sets of states.  
Table 3.  Impact of policies on employment and productivity 1996-2003: EU15 and NMS 
+  positive impact;   =  neutral   ; -  negative impact 
Policy Level Employment Productivity 
  EU15 NMS EU15 NMS 
Energy liberalisation Sector - - + = 
Communications liberalisation Sector + - + + 
Inland transport liberalisation Sector + - = = 
      
Cohesion policy Economy = + = + 
Source: Calculated from EC Horizontal Evaluation 2006; Fourth report on Economic and Social Cohesion 2007 
42
 
6. Conclusions 
Firstly, the debate on policies in these sectors needs to be guided by reference to a much wider range of 
issues than simply the extension of the internal market. The EU treaties themselves include a far wider range 
of objectives than the internal market, and the evaluation recognises the relevance of the impact on 
employment and cohesion, but the EC sees liberalisation as synonymous with improvement. 
43
 If the EC 
continues to produce evaluation reports in the same way as for 2004, 2005 and 2006, it is certain that they 
will conclude for 2007, 2008, 2009 and all future years that current policies are correct and the only 
improvements necessary are to increase and accelerate the extent of liberalisation. 
The proposed revision to the treaty should help force a re-appraisal of this position.  The proposed new 
article 3 includes a commitment to work for:  “a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment.”, and strengthens  the commitment to “take care that services [of general economic interest] 
operate on the basis of principles and conditions, particularly economic and financial conditions, which 
enable them to fulfil their missions” 44.  Social, employment, environmental and public service objectives are 
not subordinate to the maximisation of the internal market. 
 
Secondly, democratic institutions and public debate should be central to evaluation and review of the 
liberalisation policies. There is evidence that in Europe, as in the USA, citizens mistrust the behaviour of 
private companies and believe that they are being exploited under retail competition, and may prefer the 
certainty provided by vertically integrated public monopolies in these services. This choice has to be made 
through democratic political institutions, as in the USA, not through market mechanisms. Governments, 
public authorities, stakeholders and the public itself need to be actively involved in a democratic assessment 
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of policies. And this debate needs to be informed by data and analysis from a range of independent analysts, 
not a single technical paper produced by the EC itself. 
 
Thirdly, the EC needs to follow the public in making a more hardheaded assessment of how companies 
actually behave. At present, their evaluations are based on a naïve ideal of competitive behaviour by 
companies which bears little relations to the oligopolistic and opportunistic behaviour actually observed.   
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